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Abstract
Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs that
can be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential search
among ￿rms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new o⁄ering. An
o⁄ering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extent
to which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibrium, only two design-
styles arise: either the most niche where consumers are likely to either love or loathe
the product, or the broadest where consumers are likely to have similar valuations. In
equilibrium, di⁄erent ￿rms may simultaneously o⁄er both design-styles. We perform
comparative statics on the equilibrium and show that a fall in search costs can lead to
higher industry prices and pro￿ts and lower consumer surplus. Our analysis is related
to discussions of how the internet has led to the prevalence of niche goods and the
"long tail" phenomenon.
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11 Introduction
Firms, through their choices of marketing and product design, have some ability to a⁄ect
the nature of demand that they face. A growing literature, notably Johnson and Myatt
(2006) and Lewis and Sappington (1994), has considered these decisions. More recently,
Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuæat (2008, 2009) put more emphasis on consumers￿information-
gathering decisions and highlight that these are co-determined with the ￿rm￿ s pricing and
marketing strategies in equilibrium. This literature has focused on monopoly settings,
instead this paper is one of the ￿rst to extend the analysis to a competitive environment.
This leads to a wide variety of results that shed light on the coexistence of niche goods
with mass market strategies, the related ￿long tail￿phenomenon, and popular discussions
on the e⁄ects of the internet.
In order to introduce competition among ￿rms and allow for consumer information-
gathering in analytically tractable way, we build on an established and well-explored model
which considers consumers who search both to obtain price-quotes and to learn about the
extent to which di⁄erentiated goods suit them (Wolinsky, 1986; Bakos, 1997; Anderson and
Renault, 1999). Antecedents of these and related models of search have a long history in
industrial organization (see for example, Stiglitz, 1989). Recently, and with the perception
that the internet should lead to falling search costs, there has been renewed academic and
popular interest in consumer search and in such search models.1
In particular, Anderson (2004, 2006) sparked widespread interest and discussion of
how changes in production and search technologies have changed the pattern of sales and
the market shares of the most popular goods as compared to fringe goods in the "long
tail". This discussion both builds on previous academic work and has sparked further
exploration (see Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2006) for a discussion and further references).
Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2006) also suggest that "the Long Tail will change the kinds
of products that are pro￿table". This paper formally exploring this idea, contributing to
this debate.
Formally, we consider ￿rms that compete by choosing price and "design" along the lines
of Johnson and Myatt￿ s (2006) model of a monopoly rotating demand: Here, competitive
￿rms can choose designs from a range which vary between broad market designs that are
ino⁄ensive to all consumers, or more niche or quirky designs which are either loved or
1See for example, Bakos (1997) which has been cited more than 1,000 times, and Baye, Morgan and
Scholten (2006) who focus, in particular, on the persistence of price dispersion in the online world.
2loathed.2 Consumers search among ￿rms in a way that is standard in models of costly
sequential search: Each consumer can pay a small cost to obtain a price-quote from an
additional ￿rm and learn about the extent to which the product o⁄ered by that ￿rm is
well-suited to his tastes.
The model generates a number of simple and interesting results. First, ￿rms choose
extremal product designs; that is, either a most broad-based design or a most niche design.
Moreover, for su¢ ciently low search costs, all ￿rms choose the most niche designs available.
Further, as is common in search models, but perhaps less noted in popular discussions,
search costs and scale e⁄ects have very di⁄erent e⁄ects on outcomes.
Perhaps, most striking are the results at intermediate levels of search costs where we
illustrate that both kinds of extremal designs might co-exist: Some ￿rms choose a broad-
based design and pricing strategy, while all other ￿rms choose a niche strategy. Thus,
the model predicts that sales and price distributions should be bi-modal, as suggested by
Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2006). While other models can generate similar patterns,
they do so through assuming di⁄erences in the productivity of ￿rms either exogenously
as in (Goldmanis et al.; 2009, Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee; 2006) or through a process
of technological innovation with di⁄erent competing vintages (for example, Aghion et al.
2005). Instead, here such patterns arise even when all ￿rms have identical technological
opportunities.
Further, by allowing for an endogenous choice of product designs we are able to analyze
the combined e⁄ects of decreasing search costs on prices, both directly, through increased
competition, and indirectly, through a higher prevalence of niche designs. The e⁄ect of
more niche designs on price can overcome the e⁄ect of competition, thus leading to prices,
pro￿ts and welfare being non monotonic in search costs. There is a clear intuition: With low
search costs, and consumers visiting many stores, ￿rms have to o⁄er consumers something
very attractive not only in terms of price, but also in terms of the utility that the good
provides. This latter consideration leads ￿rms to choose niche designs, but e⁄ectively these
niche designs di⁄erentiate ￿rms and so soften price competition.
Some of these results echo intuitions that have appeared elsewhere in the literature. In
particular, Kuksov (2004) presents a duopoly model where consumers know the varieties
2Note that, as in Johnson and Myatt (2006), we need not require a physical design interpretation
to induce demand rotations. Firms might similarly induce demand rotations through providing more or
less information: in an e-commerce application this might take the form of more or less detailed product
descriptions.
3available (but not their location) prior to search and di⁄erent designs come with di⁄erent
costs associated and Cachon, Terwiesch and Xu (forthcoming) focus speci￿cally on multi-
product ￿rms, where consumers search costlessly within a ￿rm but at some cost between
￿rms. Our model allows for a continuum of designs and much more general demand
speci￿cation and, moreover, in marked contrast to these papers, highlights the emergence
of asymmetric market structures where broad and niche designs co-exist with no ￿rms that
seek intermediate design strategies.
2 Model
There is a continuum of ￿rms of measure 1. Each ￿rm produces a single product. There
is a continuum of consumers of measure m. Each consumer, l, has tastes described by a
conditional utility function (not including any search costs) of the form
uli(pi) = ￿pi + "li for i = 1;:::;N (1)
if she buys product i at price pi. The term "li can be interpreted as a match value between
consumer l and product i. Here "li is the realization of a random variable with distribution
function Fi. We assume that realizations of the "li are independent.3 Note that in this
speci￿cation, we assume that the consumer is risk neutral.
A consumer incurs a search cost c to learn the price pi charged by any particular ￿rm
i as well as her match value "li for the product sold by that ￿rm. Consumers search
sequentially. The utility of a consumer l is given by
ulk(pk) ￿ kc, (2)
if she buys product k at price pk at the kth ￿rm she visits.
As is standard in the search literature (and will become clear later), a consumer￿ s
search and purchase behaviour can be described by a threshold rule U: she buys the
current product obtaining uli(pi) if this is less or equal than U; and continues searching
otherwise.
3Taking these realizations to be independent, while consistent with the previous literature on search
models (Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999)) is not without loss of generality insofar as it
does not permit us to model di⁄erent ￿rms attempting to target di⁄erent niches. That is, there is no spatial
notion of di⁄erentiation or product positioning. However, given that we assume a continuum of ￿rms and
no ability for consumers to determine location in advance, this assumption may be more reasonable. Some
of the outcomes are similar to the ones of a spatial model (see Bakos, 1997).
4We introduce the notion of design by supposing that the distribution of consumer tastes
at a given ￿rm Fi is ￿rm speci￿c. The ￿rm picks a design s from a set S = [B;N] and
a design leads to a distribution of consumer tastes Fs(￿) with support on some interval
(￿s;￿s) and logconcave densities fs(￿). Regardless of design, the ￿rm produces goods at a
marginal cost of 0.
The strategy for each ￿rm i, therefore, consists not only of a choice of price pi but (in
a departure from Wolinsky (1986), Bakos (1997) and Anderson and Renault (1999)) also
a choice of a product design si 2 S. We suppose that there are no costs associated with
choosing di⁄erent designs s.
We follow Johnson and Myatt (2006) in supposing that di⁄erent product designs induce
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s is increasing in s. The notion of a demand
rotation essentially is a formal approach to the notion that some designs lead to a wider
spread in consumer valuations than others. In particular, a higher value of s should be
interpreted as a more ￿quirky￿product which appeals more to some consumers and less
to others.
Note that, although we assume that many ￿rms can choose the same type of product
design s, this is not to say that from consumer￿ s perspective their products are the same,
since at each ￿rm she would get a new realization from the distribution Fs.
Our notion of equilibrium is Nash in consumer and ￿rm strategies.4 Speci￿cally, con-
sumers choose a threshold U, while ￿rms choose a pair (p;s). Given that all ￿rms are alike,
they will all choose the same strategy if there is one that dominates the rest. In case of
indi⁄erence, we will describe the equilibrium as a mixed strategy one, that is, as if each
￿rm chooses an element from ￿ 2 ￿(R ￿ [B;N]). Note that this is equivalent to having
each ￿rm choosing a pure strategy and the distribution of these pure strategies being ￿:
Finally, note that there always exist equilibria where consumers do not search and ￿rms
choose prohibitively high prices. We do not consider such equilibria if others exist.
2.1 Consumer behaviour
Suppose that a consumer expect ￿rms to choose strategy ￿. When the consumer currently
holds a best o⁄er with utility U, then if the consumer samples another ￿rm and ￿nds a
product with price p and match value ", she will prefer it only if ￿p + " > U. In this case
4In particular this implies passive beliefs: That is, if a consumer observes an o⁄-equilibrium price it does
not a⁄ect her search and purchase rule.
5the additional utility obtained is " ￿ (U + p) and so the expected incremental utility from
searching one more ￿rm that is expected to have design s and price p is
gs;p(U) = E"(" ￿ p ￿ Uj" ￿ p > U)Pr(" ￿ p > U) =
Z 1
U+p
(" ￿ U ￿ p)fs(")d". (3)
It is, therefore, worth searching exactly one more ￿rm if and only if the expected value of
a search is worth more than the cost. That is, as long as E￿ [gs;p(U)] ￿ c, or, equivalently,








(" ￿ U ￿ p)fs(")d"
￿
￿(p;s)dpds = c. (4)
Note that there is at most one solution to (4), since the left hand side is strictly
decreasing in U. However, for c large enough, there is no U that satis￿es (4): If c is
su¢ ciently large, then no consumer would ever continue searching and ￿rms would have
full monopoly power (as in Diamond, 1971). Note that even if a consumer would prefer to
continue searching given some existing o⁄ering, this does not guarantee that the consumer
wants to start to search at all. We will later write down the conditions for search to be
initiated.
2.2 Firm pro￿t maximization
Suppose that consumers are using a U threshold strategy. Consider now the ￿rm￿ s problem
of maximizing pro￿ts by choosing (p;s): Then, a consumer who visited the ￿rm would
choose to buy as long as she received a match " such that ￿p + " > U . Thus, the
probability of sale is 1 ￿ Fs(p + U).
Consider ￿ to be the probability that a consumer who visits another ￿rm j 6= i would
buy from that ￿rm. The expected number of consumers who visit ￿rm i as a ￿rst visit is
m, a further m(1 ￿ ￿) visit the ￿rm as a second visit, m(1 ￿ ￿)2 as a third visit, and so
on. At each stage, consumers purchase from ￿rm i and exit the market with probability





(1 ￿ Fs(p + U)). (5)




p(1 ￿ Fs(p + U)). (6)
6It is useful to de￿ne ps(U) as the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t-maximizing price when the consumer￿ s
threshold is U and the design strategy is s:
ps(U) = argmaxps(1 ￿ Fs(ps + U)). (7)
This price is implicitly determined as
ps(U) =
1 ￿ Fs(ps(U) + U)
fs(ps(U) + U)
. (8)
Lemma 1 The pro￿t maximizing price ps(U) associated with a design s, when a con-
sumer￿ s stopping rule is given by U is uniquely de￿ned and is non-increasing and continuous
in U.
Proof. First note that since fs(x) is logconcave then
1￿Fs(x)
fs(x) is monotone decreasing in
x.5
Suppose (for contradiction) that at some value of U, ps(U) is increasing in U, then
also ps(U) + U is increasing in U and so
1￿Fs(ps(U)+U)
fs(ps(U)+U) = ps(U) is decreasing in U, which
provides the requisite contradiction.




ps(U)(1 ￿ Fs(ps(U) + U)), (9)
and the ￿rm￿ s problem is to maximize this with respect to its remaining strategic variable
s. Note that neither the optimal price nor the optimal design choice depend on m or ￿, as
these are just constant factors in pro￿ts6.
Johnson and Myatt (2006) have shown that in a monopoly model pro￿ts are quasi-
convex in design and so a ￿rm would choose an extremal design. In our environment,
taking the behaviour of all other ￿rms as given, the residual demand that a ￿rm faces
is still determined through a demand rotation and since the ￿rm is a monopolist on this
residual demand the result still applies and so, in our environment, ￿rms chooses extremal
designs.
5See Corollary 2 of Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) and more broadly, see this paper for functions which
do and do not satisfy this logconcavity assumption.
6This highlights that search costs play a qualitatively di⁄erent role to scale e⁄ects, which is of course a
central point of Wolinsky (1986) and discussed by Anderson and Renault (1999) who highlight that limits
when search costs tend to 0 and when the ratio of ￿rms to consumers increases are quite di⁄erent.
7Proposition 2 Firms choose extremal designs, that is either s = N or s = B.
Proof. The optimal design is chosen to maximize ps(U)(1 ￿ Fs(ps(U) + U)). Now, given
that ps￿U is an a¢ ne transform of ps, it follows that D(ps;s) as in (5) are rotation-ordered.
The proof then follows immediately from Proposition 1 in Johnson and Myatt (2006), p.
761.
To gain some intuition for this result, ￿rst consider the case where the optimal price
at a given design s is below the point of rotation so that the pro￿t-maximizing quantity is
greater than the quantity at the point of rotation 1 ￿ Fs(￿y
s). Then, decreasing s (and so
￿￿ attening￿out demand) will lead to a greater quantity sold even if the price is kept ￿xed.
Therefore decreasing s must lead to higher pro￿ts.
Next consider the case where the optimal price is above the point of rotation so that
the pro￿t-maximizing quantity is less than the quantity at the point of rotation 1￿Fs(￿y
s).
Then, increasing s (and so ￿steepening￿demand) will lead to a greater quantity sold even
if the price is kept ￿xed. Therefore increasing s must lead to higher pro￿ts in this case.
Using Proposition 2, we can restrict attention to equilibrium strategies in which ￿rms
choose a broad design (pB;B) with probability ￿ and a niche one (pN;N) with probability
(1 ￿ ￿): where pB and pN are de￿ned by (8) for s = B;N respectively.
3 Equilibrium
Given all the previous analysis, we can express an equilibrium in this model as a pair (U;￿),
where U summarizes the searching and purchase behavior of consumers and ￿ determines
the proportions of ￿rms choosing niche and broad strategies. These two parameters have to





(" ￿ U ￿ pB(U))fB(")d" + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z ￿N
U+pN(U)
(" ￿ U ￿ pN(U))fN(")d". (10)
Second, as explained above, ￿rms choose either a niche or broad position, or are indi⁄erent
between the two:
￿ = argmax￿pB(U)(1 ￿ FB(pB(U) + U)) + (1 ￿ ￿)pN(U)(1 ￿ FN(pN(U) + U)); (11)
8and third, pB(U) and pN(U) are determined by (8) as
pB(U)=




1 ￿ FN(pN(U) + U)
fN(pN(U) + U)
: (13)
As we have already pointed out, we are interested in equilibria in which consumers
do initiate their search for a product. In order to determine the relevant condition, it is













Now, we can express the expected value of initiating search V (￿;U) as
V (￿;U) = ￿(￿;U)E￿ [g￿;p(U)jU ￿ U] ￿ c + (1 ￿ ￿(￿;U))V (￿;U): (15)








(" ￿ pB(U))fB(")d" + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z ￿N
U+pN(U)




In the next sections we characterize the equilibrium in detail depending on whether
this is in mixed or pure strategies. We consider ￿rst the pure strategy equilibria and then
the mixed ones. Note that there are two possibilities to consider in pure strategies. One
in which all ￿rms choose a broad design (B), and another in which all ￿rms choose a niche
one (N). We then seek to further understand the e⁄ect of a change in search costs c on
the the ￿rm equilibrium strategies, as well as on pro￿ts and consumer surplus.
3.1 All broad equilibrium
In this case the equilibrium can be expressed as (U;￿) = (UB;1); where UB is implicitly




(" ￿ UB ￿ pB(UB))fB(")d", (17)
9Since the right hand side of (17) is decreasing in UB + pB(UB), and UB + pB(UB) is
monotonic in UB (following a similar argument to Lemma 1), there is a unique solution for
(17). Note that UB depends on c.
In order for this pair (UB;1) to be an equilibrium, one needs to make sure ￿rms do not
want to deviate to a design N, with its corresponding price pN(UB). That is,
pB(UB)(1 ￿ FB(pB(UB) + UB)) ￿ pN(UB)(1 ￿ FN(pN(UB) + UB)). (18)
It is convenient to de￿ne U as the value at which (18) holds with equality; that is, it is
implicitly de￿ned by:
pB(U)(1 ￿ FB(pB(U) + U)) = pN(U)(1 ￿ FN(pN(U) + U)). (19)
Up to this point, we have not ruled out that there may be many solutions for U, though
we will do so below.




(" ￿ U ￿ pB(U))fB(")d". (20)
Thus, cB is the search cost that induces the consumer behaviour (reservation threshold) U
when in equilibrium all ￿rms choose a broad design and price accordingly: When all ￿rms
choose a broad design, and the search cost is cB then (by de￿nition of U) the deviation
condition (18) is just binding.
Finally, we need to make sure that the consumer wants to start the search process at
all. Using, the expression derived in (16), here, this condition is
R 1
UB+pB(UB) "fB(")d" ￿ c
1 ￿ FB(UB + pB(UB))
￿ pB(UB) > 0. (21)
We can now summarize all the above in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The unique solution to consumer behaviour and its corresponding equilib-
rium prices, as determined by (17) and (12), constitute an All Broad Equilibrium if and
only if c ￿ cB and it is worthwhile for consumers to initiate search, as captured by (21).
Proof. To prove the existence of the All Broad equilibrium one needs to show that (18)
10is satis￿ed.
First consider some solution to (19), and call this particular solution U.
Note that
pB(U)(1 ￿ FB(pB(U) + U))=pN(U)(1 ￿ FN(pN(U) + U)) (22)
￿pB(U))(1 ￿ FN(pB(U) + U))
where the equality follows from the de￿nition of U and the inequality follows from the
de￿nition of pN(:) as the pro￿t-maximizing price.
It follows that
1 ￿ FB(pB(U) + U) ￿ 1 ￿ FN(pB(U) + U). (23)
Similarly
pN(U)(1 ￿ FN(pN(U) + U))￿pN(U)(1 ￿ FB(pN(U) + U)), and so
1 ￿ FN(pN(U) + U)￿1 ￿ FB(pN(U) + U) (24)
We use these fact to show that pN(U) > pB(U) and 1￿FB(pB(U)+U) > 1￿FN(pN(U)+
U).
Suppose (for contradiction) that pN(U) < pB(U). Note that since N and B are drawn
from a family of demand rotations, it follows that there is some b x such that 1 ￿ FN(x) >
1 ￿ FB(x) if and only if x > b x.
First suppose pB(U) + U > b x then 1 ￿ FN(pB(U) + U)) > 1 ￿ FB(pB(U) + U)) in
contradiction to (23). If instead b x ￿ pB(U) + U > pN(U) + U, then (24) is contradicted.
It follows that pN(U) > pB(U) and from (19), trivially 1￿FB(pB(U)) > 1￿FN(pN(U)).
Next, returning to the maximization problem, we can rewrite pB(U) and pN(U) as the
solutions to the maximization problems explicitly and so re-write (19) as:
max
pB
pB(1 ￿ FB(pB + U)) = max
pN
pN(1 ￿ FN(pN + U)). (25)
As usual, by the envelope theorem and the FOC of the previous problems we know
that d￿i
dU jU = ￿pifi(pi + U) = 1 ￿ Fi(pi(U)) for both i = B;N: Now, as argued above
d￿B
dU jU = 1 ￿ FB(pB(U)) > 1 ￿ FN(pN(U)) = d￿N
dU jU.
Since U is monotonic and decreasing in c, for higher values of c we have lower values U.
And for lower values of U than U, ￿B grows faster than ￿N:Thus, the ￿rm￿ s no deviation
11condition is satis￿ed (locally) for c ￿ cB and violated (locally) for c < cB.
Finally, consider the uniqueness of U.
Suppose (for contradiction) that there exists a c for which there are many solutions to
(19). Consider the two highest solutions and label them U1 > U2 . We know that locally,
(by the continuity of U as de￿ned in (4) in c) there exists a search cost c0 just below the
search cost c that induces U(c0) > U2 and the no deviation condition (18) fails. Similarly,
there exists some other c00 such that U1 > U(c00): Since all functions are continuous, there
must exist some U such that U1 > U(c00) > U > U(c0) > U2 which satis￿es (19). But this
contradicts that U1 and U2 were the two highest solutions.
3.2 All niche equilibrium
First, we can directly assure the existence of an All Niche equilibrium for su¢ ciently small
searching costs:
Proposition 4 When c is su¢ ciently small, then, in equilibrium, all ￿rms choose a most
niche product design s = N.
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U+pN(U)
(" ￿ U ￿ pN(U))fN(")d". (26)





ps(U)(1 ￿ Fs(ps(U) + U)). (27)
Note that as c tends to zero U + pB(U) tends to ￿B and U + pN(U) tends to ￿N:This
implies that ￿(￿;U), as de￿ned in (14) tends to zero.
Suppose for contradiction that when c tends to 0 then U < T < ￿B. Then, since
U + pB(U) tends to ￿B, it must be that pB(U) > ￿ > 0 for some constant ￿. A ￿rm by
choosing s = B and pB = ￿ would achieve unbounded pro￿ts yielding a contradiction. In
particular this contradiction shows that as c tends to zero U > T for T < ￿B arbitrarily
close to ￿B.
Now consider a ￿rm that chooses design B and price pB for all c, with positive proba-
bility. We consider a deviation to a design N and a price pB which we claim gives strictly




and deviation pro￿ts are pB
m
￿(￿;U)
(1 ￿ FN(pB + U￿)).
Since U ! ￿B then U > ￿
y
B for c low enough and, given our de￿nition of a demand
rotation, then (1￿FN (pB + U)) > (1￿FB (pB + U)). So this is a pro￿table deviation and
we reach a contradiction, which leads us to conclude that ￿ must be equal to 0.
Next, we can replicate the analysis above for the all niche equilibrium. The analogous




(" ￿ UN ￿ pN(UN))fN(")d", (28)
where pN(UN) is de￿ned in (8)
The no deviation condition now corresponds to deviating to a broad design and is:
pN(UN)(1 ￿ FN(pN(UN) + UN)) ￿ pB(UN)(1 ￿ FB(pB(UN) + UN)). (29)




(" ￿ U ￿ pN(U))fN(")d". (30)
and the equivalent condition to (21) is:
R 1
xN "fN(")d" ￿ c
1 ￿ FN(pN(UN) + UN)
￿ pN(UN) > 0. (31)
Furthermore, analogous to Proposition 3, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 There exists an All Niche Equilibrium if and only if c ￿ cN and it is
worthwhile for consumers to initiate search, as captured by (31).
Proof. It follows trivially from the proof of 3 that if there is some c0 for which an all
niche equilibrium exists then an all niche equilibrium exists if and only if c ￿ cN; however,
Proposition 4 guarantees that there is some c0 for which an all niche equilibrium exists.
133.3 Mixed Strategy Equilibria
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, where both N-designs and B-designs are chosen with
non-trivial probabilities, a ￿rm must be indi⁄erent between the two designs so that
pB(U)(1 ￿ FB(pB(U) + U)) = pN(U)(1 ￿ FN(pN(U) + U)) (32)
This implicitly de￿nes the optimal consumer strategy to the previously de￿ned value
of U: Using (20) and (30), we can rewrite (10) as:
c = ￿cB + (1 ￿ ￿)cN, (33)
Trivially, ￿ = 0 requires that c = cN; and similarly ￿ = 1 requires c = cB. In
particular (ignoring the participation/Diamond condition) there is at least one equilibrium
throughout the whole space of c. If cN > cB then there is a region of multiplicity where
all broad, all mixed and all niche coexist, otherwise, if cN < cB then the mixed strategies
equilibrium exactly ￿lls the gap between the regions where all broad and all niche exist.
Finally if cN = cB the mixed strategies equilibrium has no mass (this is the outcome with
linear demand rotations, as discussed below). Further note that in the mixed strategies
region ￿ is going to be linear in c and whether it is increasing or decreasing depends on
the relationship between cN and cB:
3.4 Summarizing the characterization
First, for high enough c, the market breaks down for standard reasons￿ ￿rms have su¢ cient
monopoly power and, since they cannot commit not to, extract so much surplus that
consumers do not consider it worthwhile to search. For lower values, of c there may be an
interval where all ￿rms choose a broad design, and within this region prices and pro￿ts are
decreasing and consumer surplus is increasing as c declines. Further, there always exists
an interval of values of [0;cN] for some cN where all ￿rms choose a niche design and within
this region prices and pro￿ts are decreasing as c declines while consumer surplus rises as c
declines. However, changes in c can lead to a shift from one of these intervals to another and
as a result, pro￿ts, prices and consumer surplus may be non-monotonic in c. An important
intuition of the paper is that two counteracting forces a⁄ect prices. Lower c increases price
competition, but price competition induces more niche designs (analogous to increasing
di⁄erentiation) that leads to lower price competition. Such changes need not only arise as
14discrete regime changes, but lower search costs can smoothly decrease consumer surplus in
the region where the mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
The partial characterization of this section does not demonstrate that there are in
fact equilibria where all ￿rms choose broad designs. We illustrate this possibility by fully
characterizing the case of linear demand rotations in Appendix A. Moreover, this exam-
ple, highlights that pro￿ts and consumer surplus can be non-monotonic in search costs.
Secondly, we show that mixed strategy equilibria can arise in Appendix B.
4 Conclusions and Extension
We brie￿ y summarize the discussion and relate it to the introductory motivation before
highlighting a number of further considerations and extensions.
Summary This paper presents a simple and tractable model integrating consumer search
and ￿rms￿strategic product design choices. Equilibrium can be characterized relatively
simply insofar as ￿rm and consumer behaviour can be separately analyzed and the ￿rms￿
strategic interactions arise only through consumer behaviour. Since there is a continuum
of ￿rms, each one has only a negligible e⁄ect on consumer behaviour. Thus, we are able to
make signi￿cant progress in characterizing the equilibrium even without having to impose
much structure on the functional form for demand.
The characterization is of some considerable interest in itself. Even though, all ￿rms are
ex-ante identical, an asymmetric industry outcome can arise where ￿rms take very di⁄er-
ent approaches￿ some taking a ￿broad-market￿strategy, seeking a very broad design and
choosing a relatively low price and others taking a ￿niche￿strategy with quirky products
priced high to take advantage of the (relatively few) consumers who are well-matched to
the product. The contrast between broad-market and niche strategies has been explored
elsewhere, notably Johnson and Myatt (2006), in the earlier of work of Lewis and Sap-
pington (1994) and, more recently, Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuæat (2009); however, these
models focus on monopolies. Instead, here we present a competitive model in a market
with search frictions where these di⁄erent strategies can coexist. The characterization of
equilibrium suggests that in examining empirical distributions of sales volumes, one might
anticipate bimodal distributions with a proportion of ￿rms clustered around high sales and
others around low sales.
This observation, and the comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to con-
sumer search costs can be brought to bear in considering demand-side explanations for
15the ￿long tail￿e⁄ect of the internet. As search costs fall, a greater proportion of ￿rms
choose the ￿niche￿strategy, and, in part, due to the di⁄erent industry structure, but in
part also since it is cheaper for consumers to more easily seek better-suited products, niche
￿rms account for a larger proportion of the industry￿ s sales. Note, that in contrast to
much discussion surrounding scale or production cost e⁄ects, we assume that production
technologies do not vary and are identical in terms of costs.
In addition, the comparative statics results are interesting in highlighting that prices
(and pro￿ts) can be non-monotonic in consumer search costs. There is an intuitive ratio-
nale: As search costs fall, then as long as the product designs remain unchanged, prices
fall. However, at ever lower prices, the ￿broad-market￿strategy becomes less appealing
to ￿rms, some of whom adopt a ￿niche￿strategy, charging a high price to the (few) con-
sumers who are well-matched for the product. Moreover, the ￿rms￿choosing to adopt a
niche strategy e⁄ectively impose a positive externality on other ￿rms, since this choice of
a niche strategy e⁄ectively acts as a form of di⁄erentiation that softens price competition.
Endogenous Firm Entry One can endogenize the proportion of consumers per ￿rm,
that is m by assuming an entry cost and allowing for a free entry condition. As discussed on
page 7, scale (as captured by m) has no e⁄ect at all on ￿rms￿equilibrium prices and designs.
So, as a consequence, the characterization of the equilibrium strategies (and of consumer
surplus) is identical to the analysis in Section (3). The sole e⁄ect of endogenizing entry
would be that net pro￿ts for ￿rms would be zero and rather than characterizing equilibrium
pro￿ts, we would characterize the number of ￿rms (that is, the ratio of ￿rms per consumer)
in the industry. Note in particular that high pro￿ts in the case of an exogenous number of
￿rms corresponds to a high ratio of ￿rms per consumer when entry is endogenous.
Coordinated industry behaviour In the model, ￿rms take their actions separately
but their choices have consequences for all other ￿rms in the industry. There is, therefore,
a rationale to try to coordinate on industry-level responses and attempt to internalize the
externalities that arise.
In particular, since pro￿ts can be non-monotonic in search costs, as search costs fall
exogenously the industry might bene￿t from further reducing search costs. Thus an in-
dustry response to the internet (which we may plausibly consider as an exogenous fall in
consumer search costs) is to provide additional enabling technologies (such as industry-
sponsored comparison sites) that further reduce search costs for consumers.
16Prominence and search order A small and recent literature has explored the e⁄ect of
prominence and search order (Arbatskaya; 2007, and Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou, 2008).
The model can easily be adapted to suppose that some ￿rms are more prominent in the
sense that the order of search is not identically distributed across ￿rms, but, instead, some
particular ￿rms are more likely to be visited sooner in a consumers search process than
others.
Such a change would have no e⁄ect whatsoever on the equilibrium decision of ￿rms,
such a notion of ￿prominence￿is similar to a scale e⁄ect. In the notation of the model,
this would act as some ￿rms facing a high value of m and others facing a low value of
m. However, scale (as captured by m) has no e⁄ect at all on ￿rms￿equilibrium prices
and designs. This echoes the result of Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2008) that with
a continuum of ￿rms, prices are una⁄ected by supposing one ￿rm is always visited ￿rst.
Prominence in their model then only plays a role when a signi￿cant number of consumers
search through every one of the products on o⁄er and consider revisiting a ￿rm that they
have already visited. One could consider adapting the model of this paper in this way;
however, for many applications it seems an unrealistic assumption, and would lead to a
much less analytically tractable model.
Search on price and product attributes As in previous literature, such as Wolinsky
(1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999), ￿search￿in this model is a combined process
whereby consumers learn all characteristics of a product (notably price and its match with
their taste) simultaneously. One could conceive of situations where it may be possible for
consumer to rationally make separate search decisions on particular product attributes,
learning price ￿rst and later considering attributes, or considering some attributes ￿rst
along the lines of Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuæat (2008). Indeed, there is considerable
discussion of these kind of search procedures as heuristics in psychology and marketing;
Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993) in an important contribution, also provide a wide-
ranging summary. An extension that allowed for such multi-dimensional search would be
substantive but of great interest.
Ex-ante ￿rm heterogeneity and superstar e⁄ects An interesting and relatively
straightforward extension is to allow for ex-ante di⁄erences in ￿rms in terms of their ￿nat-
ural￿appeal or vertical quality. Thus, before any product tailoring or design choices, some
products are simply naturally better products, with the potential to be superstars.
As discussed above, Anderson (2006) and other commentators on the e⁄ects of the inter-
17net on sales concentration have highlighted ￿long tail￿e⁄ects; there is a parallel discussion,
notably Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) arguing online retailing, has led to increased
￿superstar￿e⁄ects, with the best-selling products becoming ever-more successful.7
Extending the model to allow for ex-ante vertical product di⁄erences, can incorporate
this e⁄ect. When search costs are very high, however, consumers cannot locate these
superior products, as search costs fall, consumers should be able to more easily ￿nd them￿
suggesting a superstar e⁄ect. Note, however, that as search costs fall, the competition from
the long tail may become more severe, as inferior products choose a niche strategy yielding
more attractive options for some well-matched consumers. Indeed, it can be shown that
both the ￿superstar￿and the ￿long tail￿phenomena can coexist as inferior ￿rms gradually
switch from broad-based to niche strategies and consumers more easily ￿nd superior ￿rms.
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19A Example: Linear Demands
We analyze the particular case where demand is linear. We have shown already that we
only need to worry about extremal product designs so we can restrict the analysis to the
two linear demand functions that correspond with the most broad design (B) and the
most niche design (N). Without loss of generality, any possible family of linear demand
function can be a result of having consumer types " uniformly distributed with the following
structure "~U[0;￿s] with probability ￿s and " = 0 with probability (1 ￿ ￿s).8
In particular it is convenient to de￿ne the extremal designs (N and B) as follows:
When product design is N then "~U[0;￿N] with probability ￿N and " = 0 otherwise.
When product design is B then "~U[0;￿B] with probability ￿B and " = 0 otherwise. We
impose that ￿N > ￿B and ￿N < ￿B in order to ensure that these are demand rotations as
de￿ned above (i.e. the demand curves cross once) and the N design is the most niche one.








x + (1 ￿ ￿B) if x 2 [0;￿B].
A.1 Characterization
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It follows that cN, which is de￿ned implicitly by UN(cN) = U, and cB, which is de￿ned
implicitly by UB(cB) = U are identical and given by
cN = cB =
1
8
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(42)
For the case where all ￿rms choose a broad design the condition for the consumer to
ever visit a second ￿rm once she has visited a ￿rst one is the condition for the expected









Note that this condition is equivalent to UB + pB(UB) > 0.
The second condition is that the ex-ante expected surplus of starting the search process
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(44)
Note that VB > 0 implies (43) as
R ￿B





￿Bd" ￿ c =
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Note that it is necessarily the case that
￿N￿N
8 > cN = cB. Suppose that
￿B￿B
8 > cN =
cB then we can summarize the discussion above as follows.
Proposition 6 If c >
￿B￿B
8 the unique equilibrium outcome is no search by consumers
and no sales for ￿rms. For
￿B￿B
8 > c > cN = cB, the equilibrium has all ￿rms choose
the broad strategy and a price of
q
2￿N
￿N c and earn pro￿ts m
q
2￿N
￿N c and consumer surplus
is ￿N ￿ 2
q
2c￿N
￿N . Finally, for cN = cB > c, the equilibrium has all ￿rms choose the
niche strategy and a price of
q
2￿B
￿Bc, earning pro￿ts m
q
2￿B





B Example: Design Dispersion
Although we have a family of demand rotations, it is only the extremal ones that play a
role when there are no design costs, so we describe only the extreme designs. We suppose
that the niche N designs are such that FN(x) = 1
2 + x2 for x 2 (0; 1 p
2) and FB(x) = 3
2x
for x 2 (0; 2
3). In particular the two distributions implied by these designs are logconcave.
Implied demands for monopolist ￿rms are illustrated in the ￿gure below.







Monopoly demand functions for broad
and niche designs.

























￿ (pN(U) + U)2) = pB(U)(1 ￿
3
2
(pB(U) + U)). (49)
The solution is U = 0:29793 and the associated pN(U) = 0:22153 and pB(U) =
0:18437.
Next we can consider cN, and cB as in (30) and (20) to obtain cN = 2:2695￿10￿2 and
cB = 2:5494 ￿ 10￿2 and so here cB > cN.
It remains to check the conditions (31) and (21) to ensure that the ￿interesting action￿






2 ￿ (pN(U) + U)2 ￿ pN(U) > 0, or, equivalently, c < 9:1266 ￿ 10￿2, (50)
23and, similarly, (21) is given by
R 2
3
pB(U)+U 24"3d" ￿ c
1 ￿ 3
2(pN(U) + U)
￿ pB(U) > 0, or, equivalently, c < 0:10789. (51)
So the interesting action (where cB and cN are de￿ned) is indeed in an interesting
range and the mixed strategy equilibrium described in Section 3.3 does indeed arise, as
the unique equilibrium for cB > c > cN, and in this range prices increase and consumer
surplus decrease as c falls, though outside this range the comparative statics are the more
intuitive ones.
24